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TORT LAW-TORTIoUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT, THE ARKANSAS
SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES WHO HAS THE BURDEN AND WHAT THEY
HAVE TO PROVE. MASON V WAL-MARTSTORES INC., 333 Ark. 3,969
S.W.2d 160 (1998).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Mason v. Wal-Mart,l the Arkansas Supreme Court held that for a claim
of tortious interference to be actionable, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's conduct was at least improper.2 The decision represents an
attempt by the court to limit expansion of the tort of interference with a
contractual or business expectancy.3 It also suggests that the underlying
policy tension between competitiveness and protecting contractual relation-
ships is moving in the direction of encouraging competition."
This note reviews the significant facts of the Mason decision. It then
examines the history of the tort of interference with a contractual relationship
or business expectancy in Arkansas and highlights key decisions. It concludes
with an analysis of the court's reasoning and a discussion of the significance
of Mason v. Wal-Mart.
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS
A. Relevant Facts
John Mason worked as an independent manufacturer's sales representa-
tive for Century Products Company ("Century") and Pentech International
("Pentech").5 He also represented Okla Homer Smith Manufacturing
Company ("Okla Homer").' These vendors had accounts with Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart").' Mason served as the vendors' sales representative
1. 333 Ark. 3, 969 S.W.2d 160 (1998).
2. See id. at 7, 969 S.W.2d at 162.
3. See Elisa Masterson White, Comment, Arkansas Tortious Interference Law: A
Proposalfor Change, 19 U. ARK. LrTLE ROCK L.J. 81, 102 (1996). White points to the danger
of labeling legitimate business practices tortious by expanding tort liability for interference torts
while at the same time leaving them largely undefined. See id. White urged Arkansas courts
to require the plaintiff to bear the burden of proving improper interference by the defendant and
to define what behavior constitutes improper conduct. See id. at 108. White further opined that
this would insure freedom of movement within the economy and serve to encourage an efficient
allocation of resources. See id.
4. See White, supra note 3, at 101.
5. See Mason, 333 Ark. at 5, 969 S.W.2d at 160-61.
6. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 161.
7. See id. at 5,969 S.W.2d at 160. Throughout this note, the terms manufacturer, vendor,
and supplier are used interchangeably to refer to Okla Homer, Century, and Pentech.
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to Wal-Mart on an at-will contractual basis." He alleged that his contracts
with Century and Okla Homer were effective from July 1967 until early 1992.9
Mason's contract with Pentech allegedly ran from August 1980 until
December 1991.0
For more than ten years, Wal-Mart demonstrated its discontent with
dealing indirectly with vendors through independent manufacturer representa-
tives." On November 6, 1991, Wal-Mart, through its president and CEO, sent
a letter telling vendors of Wal-Mart's decision to deal directly with the
vendors' principals. 2 The letter included a definition of the term principal. 3
The definition specifically excluded persons who claimed they had a principal
relationship with one or more companies, and implied that Wal-Mart would
no longer deal with independent manufacturer representatives. 4 After Wal-
Mart issued the letter, Century, Pentech and Okla Homer removed Mason
from their Wal-Mart accounts. 5 Century re-assigned Mason to other
accounts, but Pentech terminated Mason because his service for Pentech was
on the Wal-Mart account.'
6
B. Procedural History
Mason sued Wal-Mart after his relationship with the vendors ended. 7
He alleged that he had a contract with the vendors to act as their Wal-Mart
representative." Mason asserted that Wal-Mart had interfered with his
8. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 161.
9. See id. at 6, 969 S.W.2d at 161.
10. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 161.
11. See Mason, 333 Ark. at 5, 969 S.W.2d at 161.
12. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 161; Brief for Appellee at 27-28, Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 333 Ark. 3,969 S.W.2d 160 (1998) (No. 96-01351). Wal-Mart asserted that the letter was
not sent to Pentech or Okla Homer Smith, only Century. It further stated that Century did not
terminate its relationship with Mason as a result of the letter. Century simply assigned Mason
to deal with other Century accounts. Wal-Mart stated Mason voluntarily resigned from
representing Century shortly after Century decided to deal directly with Wal-Mart. See Brief
for Appellee at 27-28, Mason (No. 96-01351).
13. See Mason, 333 Ark. at 5, 969 SW.2d at 161. "The letter defined a 'principal' as 'an
employee of your company empowered to make decisions and act on your behalf.'" Id., 969
S.W.2d at 161.
14. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 161. The letter told vendors someone from Wal-Mart would
contact them within the next few weeks. Once contacted, the vendor was to inform the person
whether the vendor agreed with Wal-Mart's decision to deal directly with the vendor's principal.
See id., 969 S.W.2d at 161.
15. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 161.
16. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 161. Okla Homer's president testified that he continued to deal
with Wal-Mart himself, as he always had. See id. at 5-6, 969 S.W.2d at 161.
17. See id. at 6, 969 S.W.2d at 161.
18. See id. at 6, 969 S.W.2d at 161.
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contractual relationship and business expectancy by using its economic
powers to coerce suppliers to deal directly with Wal-Mart rather than through
him.' 9
The Crittenden County, Arkansas Circuit Court said that for an
interference to be actionable, it must be improper.2" The court granted
summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, holding that Mason did not prove
that Wal-Mart's conduct was improper, a necessary element of his claim.2
Because Mason did not present proof of an essential element, the trial court
found that this entitled Wal-Mart to ajudgment as a matter of law.22
Mason appealed the summary judgment to the Arkansas Supreme Court,
raising two arguments. 23 First, Mason argued that the trial court improperly
required him to prove an element of intentional interference with a contractual
relationship that Arkansas law does not require: that the defendant's conduct
was improper or wrongful.24 Second, Mason argued that, even if Arkansas
law required he prove that Wal-Mart acted improperly, he had provided
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to improper
conduct on Wal-Mart's pan.
25
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that a claim of interference with a
contractual relationship requires that the plaintiff prove that the defendant's
conduct was at least improper.26 Because the trial court concluded that Mason
19. See id. at 6, 969 S.W.2d at 161; Brief for Appellant at 72, Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 333 Ark. 3, 969 S.W.2d 160 (1998) (No. 96-01351). Mason claimed that Wal-Mart was
able to exert economic coercion on the vendors because of the substantial volume of business
Wal-Mart conducted with each vendor. Specifically, Wal-Mart's account with Century
represented 15% to 20% of all Century sales; its account with Pentech represented 25% of
Pentech's total sales; and Wal-Mart's account with Okla Homer Smith represented 25% to 30%
of its sales. Mason asserted that because of Wal-Mart's sheer economic influence over each
vendor's business, the vendors had no choice but to deal with Wal-Mart in the manner Wal-
Mart preferred. See Brief for Appellant at 72, Mason (No. 96-01351).
20. See Mason, 333 Ark. at 6-7, 969 S.W.2d at 161.
21. See id. at 6,969 S.W.2d at 161.
22. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 161. The trial court did not address Wal-Mart's assertion of
privilege. Because both the trial court and the appellate court did not address this issue, this
note will not include a discussion of the privilege assertion.
23. See id. at 7, 969 S.W.2d at 162.
24. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 162.
25. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 162. The evidence Mason referred to was the letter sent by Mr.
Glass, CEO of Wal-Mart, and a 1982 incident where an employee of Wal-Mart allegedly asked
Century to end its relationship with Mason and transfer any savings it gained by the termination
to Wal-Mart. See id. at 6, 969 S.W.2d at 161. While the trial court conceded that economic
pressure could be improper conduct, it found that Wal-Mart's competitive conduct was not
improper, because it was neither illegal nor independently actionable. See id. at 6-7, 969
S.W.2d at 161-62.
26. See Mason, 333 Ark. at 7, 969 S.W.2d at 162.
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did not show that Wal-Mart's conduct was improper, the Arkansas Supreme
Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.27
mJJ. BACKGROUND
A. General Background
Tortious interference had its origin in early Roman law, where it allowed
the head of a household to bring an action against a person who injured any
member of his household.2" It later expanded to allow a master to recover for
the loss of service when someone inflicted injury upon his servant.29 Liability
grew when England introduced compulsory labor to combat a severe labor
shortage and gave a remedy to an employer whose employee left to work for
someone else.3°
Lumley v. Gye31 extended the doctrine beyond a master-servant
relationship. Lumley, which dealt with an opera singer who was under
contract to sing in the plaintiff's theater and was induced by the defendant to
breach her agreement, is credited with beginning the doctrine of tortious
interference with a contract.32 A defendant may either be liable for interfering
with an existing contract between the plaintiff and a third person, or for
interfering with the plaintiff's expected economic gain.33 A tortious
interference claim may lie in tort, which will allow punitive damages, or
contract, which seeks to give parties the benefit of their bargain.34
27. See id. at 4-5, 969 S.W.2d at 160.
28. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROssER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at
979-80 (5th ed. 1984).
29. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 28, at 980.
30. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 980; see also Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious
Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REv. 335, 340 (1980).
31. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
32. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 28, at 980.
33. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 28, at 978.
34. See, e.g., L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, where the court addressed a tortious
interference of an existing contract or business expectancy action in tort or contract. 282 Ark.
6, 665 S.W.2d 278 (1984). The court held that a plaintiff alleging tortious interference "must
specifically plead and prove his cause of action in tort in order to be awarded punitive
damages." Id. at 10, 665 S.W.2d at 281. Otherwise, the court would assume the action was in
contract. See id. at 10, 665 S.W.2d at 281.
[Vol. 21
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
B. Tortious Interference with Contract-Infancy Stage in Arkansas
History
Early Arkansas tortious interference with contract cases required malice
or willful interference, with the burden of proof on the plaintiff." In Mahoney
v. Roberts,36 Roberts sued Mahoney, along with Mahoney's wife and stepson,
for intentional interference with contract containing a covenant not to
compete." The court found the defendants were liable because their actions
were done with the intent to injure Roberts or to gain some benefit at Roberts'
expense."'
In Mason v. Funderburk,39 the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that a
malicious act does not require actual malice (i.e. spite, ill will); rather, it
requires legal malice (an intentional doing of something harmful, without
justification or excuse).40 The court acknowledged that recovery of damages
is allowed when a person, without privilege, purposely causes another not to
enter into or continue a business relationship with a third party, if the
inducement is tortious.4" In Elliott v. Elliott," the court cited Funderburk and
reinforced the notion that malice is a necessary requirement of the tort of
wrongful interference with the contractual rights and business relationships
of another.43
35. See generally Mahoney v. Roberts, 86 Ark. 130, 110 S.W. 225 (1908); Mason v.
Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521,446 S.W.2d 543 (1969); Elliott v. Elliott, 252 Ark. 966,482 S.W.2d
123 (1972).
36. 86 Ark. 130, 110 S.W. 225 (1908).
37. See id. at 136, 110 S.W. at 226.
38. See id. at 139, 110 S.W. at 228.
39. 247 Ark. 521, 446 S.W.2d 543 (1969).
40. See id. at 526, 446 S.W.2d at 546. The court also recognized a tortious interference
of contract claim as including situations where the employment is for an unexpired fixed term
or terminable at-will. See id. at 526, 446 S.W.2d at 546. Fred Mason was a district manager
who worked for Field Enterprises Education Corporation. He sold encyclopedias and
dictionaries on a commission basis in northeast Arkansas. His contract was terminable at will
upon 30 days notice by either party. Mason became a member of the local school board and
began to have problems with other board members, a school superintendent, and a school
principal. As a result of the conflict, the school superintendent sent letters to Mason's
employer, asking Field Enterprises to fire Mason and also stating that he would not buy a new
set of encyclopedias from the company through Mason. Field Enterprises, through its agent,
Funderburk, terminated Mason's contract. See id. at 523, 531, 446 S.W.2d at 545, 549.
41. See id. at 525-26, 446 S.W.2d at 546 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 cmts.
(1939)). In discussing what is meant by tortious behavior, the Restatement gives examples of
intimidation, fraud, or other wrongful behavior that A uses to coerce B to choose one course of
conduct over the other. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 cmts. (1939).
42. 252 Ark. 966, 482 S.W.2d 123 (1972).
43. See id. at 974, 482 S.W.2d at 128.
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The rationale for the early endorsement of malice or wilful interference
as a requirement of tortious interference with a contract was based on the
premise that the right to perform a contract and reap the benefits derived from
it was a property right which entitled each party of a contract to its
fulfillment." This fundamental right was reiterated in Mason v. Funderburk,
where the court stated that a person has a right to pursue valid contractual and
business expectancies free from wrongful and officious intermeddling by third
parties.45
C. Growing Pains-Expand or Constrict Defendant's Liability?
In Stebbins & Roberts, Inc. v. Halsey,46 the Arkansas Supreme Court
announced a new development in tortious interference with contract claims by
beginning a shift away from requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant
acted with malice or wilful intention as an element of the tort.47 The court
adopted the approach of Prosser and stated that intentional interference with
the contractual rights of another is prima facie sufficient for liability.48 Once
the plaintiff proved intentional interference, the burden shifted to the
defendant to prove privilege. 9 The approach adopted in Stebbins created a
new emphasis on the purpose or object which the defendant sought to
advance. 0 It also upheld the ethical concept that a competitor should have a
"hands off" approach to the contracts of others and stressed that existing
contracts take precedent over an interest in unbridled competition." After
Stebbins, Arkansas courts recognized four elements that a plaintiff had to
prove in a tortious interference with an existing contract or a business
44. See Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. at 526, 446 S.W.2d at 546-47; see also White,
supra note 3, at 93-94.
45. See Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. at 527, 446 S.W.2d at 547. The court also stated
that just because employment is at the will of the parties does not make it subject to the will of
others. See id. at 528, 446 S.W.2d at 548.
46. 265 Ark. 903, 582 S.W.2d 266 (1979).
47. See id. at 907, 582 S.W.2d at 268.
48. See id. at 906-07, 582 S.W.2d at 267-68. The approach was also recognized in
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766, which imposed liability for any intentional interference without
justification or defense. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939).
49. See Stebbins, 265 Ark. at 907,582 S.W.2d at 268. The court in Stebbins cited Prosser
for the proposition that other circumstances may privilege the defendant's conduct when she
acts to her own advantage. See also PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 129 (4th ed., 1971). For
example, a defendant is privileged to prevent the performance of a contract that threatens an
existing economic interest. A privilege does not exist, however, if defendant's interest is
simply to protect a prospective advantage, such as business competition. See Stebbins, 265 Ark.
at 906, 582 S.W.2d at 267.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 906-07, 582 S.W.2d at 267.
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expectancy as including: (1) the existence of a valid contractual business
relationship or expectancy; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship
or expectancy; (3) intentional interference that induced or caused a breach of
the relationship or expectancy; and (4) damage to the party who experienced
a disruption of the relationship or expectancy."
The Arkansas Supreme Court appeared to reintroduce the element of bad
faith in Walt Bennett Ford, Inc. v. Pulaski County Special School District,"
where the appellee brought an action as a result of an unsuccessful bid on a
school contract. The court held that the school officials were not liable
because they did not act in bad faith and their interference was privileged as
protecting the public interest.54 The court then issued a supplemental opinion
that reiterated the general rule announced in Stebbins that bad faith or
improper motive is not an essential element of plaintiff's claim of interference
with existing contractual relations and that the burden shifts to the defendant
to show her conduct was privileged." The court distinguished Walt Bennett
from Stebbins and stated that Walt Bennett dealt with interference with a
business expectation and not an existing contract, 6 The court stated that the
primary difference between an interference with an existing contract and an
interference with a business expectancy is that the tort of interference with
business expectations allows more privileges.57
52. See Walt Bennett Ford, Inc. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 274 Ark. 208, 214,
624 S.W.2d 426, 429 (1981). See also W.E. Long Co. v. Holsum Baking Co., 307 Ark. 345,
820 S.W.2d 440 (1991); Mid-South Bev., Inc. v. Forrest City Grocery Co., 300 Ark. 204, 778
S.W.2d 218 (1989); Jim Orr & Assocs., Inc. v. Waters, 299 Ark. 526, 773 S.W.2d 99 (1989);
Kinco Inc. v. Schueck Steel, Inc., 283 Ark. 72, 671 S.W.2d 178 (1984). These cases list the
four elements oftortious interference with contract and state that bad faith is not a requirement,
but that the defendant can show privilege. But see United Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Sampson, 310
Ark. 47, 832 S.W.2d 502 (1992), for a momentary retreat from Stebbins. The court in United
defined tortious interference with contract as imposing liability on someone who intentionally
and with malice interferes. It also stated that punitive damages could be awarded if a person
maliciously interferes. In United, Sampson, a person whose home was damaged by a fire, filed
a claim against the mortgagee, United Bilt, saying that United Bilt interfered with a contractual
relationship Sampson had with a third party to repair the home. The court held that United
Bilt's interference was wrongful and that the defendant's conduct forced Sampson to breach his
contract. See United, 310 Ark. at 51-52, 832 S.W.2d at 503-04.
53. 274 Ark. 208, 624 S.W.2d 426 (1981).
54. See id. at 214, 624 S.W.2d at 429.
55. See id. at 214-A, 624 S.W.2d at 429.
56. See id. at 214-A-B, 624 S.W.2d at 429.
57. See id. at 214-B, 624 S.W.2d at 430. The court cited PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS,
749 (2d ed. 1955), HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 6.12 (1956), and RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 767, cmt. d (1939) to support the proposition that a protection of a public interest is
recognized as affording a privilege to acts of interference. See Walt Bennett, 274 Ark. at 214-B,
624 S.W.2d at 430.
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The Arkansas Model Jury Instructions, Civil adopted the Stebbins
approach in AMI 406, Interference with Contractual Relationship or Business
Expectancy." The approach received criticism from several sources,
however.59 It was criticized primarily because it placed liability on a
defendant without giving her notice that the conduct was prohibited or
permitted, and required the defendant to justify her behavior without
specifying what constituted justification.' The defendant was left knowing
that she was entitled to a defense, although it remained ambiguous as to what
would suffice as an acceptable one. 6' Also, the claimant in a tortious
interference with contract complaint did not have to prove in any way that the
interference was improper as part of her prima facie case.62 The plaintiff was
only required to show: (1) the existence of a contractual relationship or
business expectancy, (2) that the defendant intended to interfere with her
interest, and (3) the defendant did in fact interfere.63
D. All Grown Up--Burden on Plaintiff to Show Conduct Improper
The Arkansas Supreme Court abandoned the Stebbins approach in Fisher
v. Jones.' In Fisher, the court held that for a tortious interference of contract
claim to be actionable, it must be improper.65 The court erroneously cited
Walt Bennett as holding that conduct must be improper for an interference to
be actionable.' Although the Fisher court introduced impropriety, it did not
58. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL3d., § 406 (1995 Supp.). AM1406 lists
five essential elements that a plaintiff has to prove: (1) that she sustained damages; (2) that she
had a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (3) that the defendant had
knowledge of the contractual relationship and/or business expectancy; (4) that by intentional
interference the defendant induced or caused a disruption or termination of the contractual
relationship and/or business expectancy; and (5) that the disruption or termination was a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. The defendant could claim the conduct was
privileged as an affirmative defense to the plaintiff's claim. If the defendant claimed this
defense, the defendant bore the burden of proof. Although AMI 406 lists five elements, courts
often combine elements (1) and (5) and refer to four elements of the tort.
59. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 983-84 & n.61-62; see also Dobbs,
supra note 30, at 335; White, supra note 3, at 81.
60. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 983.
61. See Dobbs, supra note 30, at 345.
62. See White, supra note 3, at 81.
63. See White, supra note 3, at 87.
64. 311 Ark. 450, 844 S.W.2d 954 (1993).
65. See id. at 458, 844 S.W.2d at 959. But see Nicholson v. Simmons First Nat'l Corp.,
312 Ark. 291, 849 S.W.2d 483 (1993); Belin v. West, 315 Ark. 61, 864 S.W.2d 838 (1993).
In both cases the court listed four elements of tortious interference that the plaintiff is required
to prove and does not list improper conduct by defendant as an element of the action.
66. See Fisher, 311 Ark. at 458, 844 S.W.2d at 959. The supplemental opinion in Walt
Bennett actually stated, "[tihe general rule is that an improper motive or bad faith is no longer
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specifically state which party bore the burden with respect to the propriety of
the defendant's conduct." The court cited the multi-factored test of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts to determine when interference is improper.8
Hunt v. Riley69 represents the first instance where the Arkansas Supreme
Court imposed the burden of pleading improper conduct by the defendant on
the plaintiff.7" In Hunt, an attorney brought a suit for tortious interference of
a business expectancy on behalf of a class of attorneys against several
defendants.7 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants solicited accident
victims and referred the victims to specific attorneys.7" The Arkansas
Supreme Court dismissed the claim because the plaintiff did not allege that the
defendants' conduct was improper." The court listed the four elements of a
tortious interference with contract claim and restated the rule in Fisher, which
required that interference be improper for a claim to be actionable.74 The rules
an essential part of the plaintiff's case in the tort of interference with existing contractual
relations." Walt Bennett, 274 Ark. 208, 214-A, 624 S.W.2d 426, 429.
67. See Fisher, 311 Ark. at 458, 844 S.W.2d at 959.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 767 (1979):
In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with a contract
or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not, consideration is
given to the following factors:
a)the nature of the actor's conduct,
b)the actor's motive,
c)the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
d)the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
e)the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other,
f)the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
g)the relations between the parties.
Id.
In addition, the court also considered RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §769:
One who, having a financial interest in the business of a third person intentionally
causes that person not to enter into a prospective contractual relation with another,
does not interfere improperly with the other's relation if he (a) does not employ
wrongful means and (b) acts to protect his interest from being prejudiced by the
relation.
Id.
69. 322 Ark. 453, 909 S.W.2d 329 (1995).
70. See id. at 459, 909 S.W.2d at 332.
71. See id at 455, 909 S.W.2d at 330.
72. See id. at 456, 909 S.W.2d at 331.
73. See id. at 458-60, 909 S.W.2d at 332-33.
74. See id. at 458, 909 S.W.2d at 332. But see Cross v. Arkansas Livestock and Poultry
Comm'n, 328 Ark. 255, 943 S.W.2d 230 (1997); Brown v. Tucker, 330 Ark. 435,954 S.W.2d
262 (1997). In Cross and Brown, the court listed four elements of a claim for tortious
interference with a contract or business expectancy, and does not list or refer to improper
conduct by the defendant as a necessary element of the tort. The Cross court also cited United
for the principle that a person who maliciously interferes with the contractual relations of
another incurs liability. The court in Cross recognized that a contractual relationship does not
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announced in Fisher and Hunt suggested that impropriety was an element of
an action for tortious interference with a contract, and that the plaintiff must
make the allegation. Mason v. Wal-Mart represents the court's effort to
crystallize what the elements of the tort are and who bears the burden of proof.
IV. REASONING OF THECOURT
A. Majority Opinion
In Mason v. Wal-Mart,7" the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
in an interference with contract claim must show that the defendant's conduct
was at least improper.76 The court began with an extensive review of the tort's
history in Arkansas law." It then discussed the three approaches used in
Arkansas law at various times to assign liability in an interference with
contract claim: (1) requiring plaintiff to show defendant acted maliciously or
with bad faith; (2) requiring the plaintiff to show some type of interference
and then shifting the burden to the defendant to prove her actions were
justified in some way; and (3) requiring the plaintiff to show that the
defendant acted improperly.7
1. Requirement of Malice or Bad Faith
As outlined by the court, early Arkansas cases on interference with an
existing contract claim required that the plaintiff show the interference was
have to exist to maintain an action and stated the premise that a person has a right to pursue a
valid contract and/or business expectancy without being bothered by wrongful interference or
intermeddling of another. See Cross, 328 Ark. at 262, 943 S.W.2d at 234.
75. 333 Ark. 3, 969 S.W.2d 160 (1998).
76. See Mason, 333 Ark. at 7, 969 S.W.2d at 162.
77. See id. at 7-8, 969 S.W.2d at 162.
78. See id, 969 S.W.2d at 162. See also Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 446
S.W.2d 543 (1969) (requiring plaintiff to establish that defendant acted wrongfully or
improperly); Elliott v. Elliott, 252 Ark. 966, 482 S.W.2d 123 (1972) (requiring that the
interference be malicious); Stebbins & Roberts, Inc. v. Halsey, 265 Ark. 903, 582 S.W.2d 266
(1970) (holding that once plaintiff established wrongful intent, the burden shifted to the
defendant to show conduct was privileged); Walt Bennett Ford, Inc. v. Pulaski County Special
Sch. Dist., 274 Ark. 209, 624 S.W.2d 426 (1981) (holding that the general rule in Arkansas is
that bad faith is no longer an essential requirement of an interference with contract claim). But
see United Bilt Homes v. Sampson, 310 Ark. 47, 51, 832 S.W.2d 502, 503 (1992) (imposing
liability for malicious interference); Cross v. Arkansas Livestock & Poultry Comm'n, 328 Ark.
255, 262, 943 S.W.2d 230, 234 (1997) (citing United for the proposition that a person must act
maliciously); Fisher v. Jones, 311 Ark. 450, 844 S.W.2d 954 (1993) (holding that for an
interference with contract claim to be actionable, the conduct must be improper).
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wrongful or malicious.79 However, this requirement was abandoned." The
court compared language from a former edition of Prosser and Keeton on
Torts to the language of a later edition and agreed that malice or spite is not
a requirement for liability."'
2. Imposing Liability for Any Intentional Interference Resulting in
Harm and Requiring that Defendant Prove the Action Was Privi-
leged
The court next discussed the approach adopted in Stebbins & Roberts,
Inc. v. Halsey.12  Under the Stebbins approach, once the plaintiff proved
wrongful interference plus damages, the burden shifted to the defendant to
prove the existence of a justification or privilege. 3 The court rejected the
second approach because it entitled the interferer to a defense of privilege or
justification without clearly defining what constituted privilege or justifica-
tion. 4
3. Subjecting Defendant to Liability for Knowingly and Purposefully
Interfering with a Contract Only When the Plaintiff Can Prove
Defendant's Actions Were Improper
After discussing the two previous approaches and the problems
associated with them, the court proceeded to the approach it would embrace:
requiring proof of impropriety as an element of a plaintiff's claim of
interference with a contractual contract.8 5
The court cited examples of how it had applied the improper conduct
concept intermittently in the past, first in Kinco v. Schueck Steel, Inc.," and
79. See Mason, 333 Ark at 8, 969 S.W.2d at 162.
80. See id. at 10-11,969 S.W.2d at 163-64 (citing L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 282
Ark. 6, 8-9, 665 S.W.2d 278, 290 (1984) (holding that bad faith is not a requirement)). The
Mason court also cited United Bilt Homes v. Sampson, 310 Ark. 47, 51, 832 S.W.2d 502-03
(1992).
81. See Mason, 333 Ark. at 9-10, 969 S.W.2d at 163; KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at
983-84 & nn.61, 62.
82. 265 Ark. 903, 582 S.W.2d 266 (1979).
83. See id. at 907, 582 S.W.2d at 268. For a general discussion of the Stebbins approach
see supra text accompanying notes 46-63.
84. See Mason, 333 Ark. at 13, 969 S.W.2d at 165. The court points to language used by
Dan B. Dobbs, Professor of Law, University of Arizona, which describes the procedure used
in the second approach as "a sorry state of affairs." See Dobbs, supra note 30, at 345.
85. See Mason, 333 Ark. at 14, 969 S.W.2d at 165.
86. 283 Ark. 72, 671 S.W.2d 178 (1984). In Kinco, the court affirmed the lower court's




then in Fisher v. Jones.7 In addition, the court referenced its affirmance of
the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint in Hunt v. Riley8
because the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant's conduct was
improper.8 9 The court noted that the Restatement (Second) of Torts has also
endorsed the requirement of improper conduct." While the court appeared
sensitive to the view that a third party should be held liable only if the conduct
is independently tortious, it declined to go that far and instead held that the
conduct must be at least improper as defined by the factors listed in the
Restatement. 91
After the court endorsed the approach requiring that the plaintiff who
alleges tortious interference with a contract or business expectancy prove that
defendant's conduct was improper, it applied the approach to the facts before
it.92 The court considered the economic pressure that Wal-Mart allegedly
used, applying the factors listed in section 767, comment c of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts to determine if the pressure was proper (these factors
include the circumstances in which the pressure is exerted, the purpose gained,
the amount of force used, the extent of harm threatened, the effect of the
pressure upon neutral parties as well as competition and the overall reason-
ableness of the pressure as a way to accomplish the actor's intention).93 The
court then rejected Mason's argument that Wal-Mart's conduct was improper
and explained that requiring ajury to evaluate Wal-Mart's conduct in relation
to the guidance provided in the Restatement would mandate the same
evaluation every time a business refused to do business to obtain a better
price.'
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Glaze dissented and indicated that the court's decision was at
odds with the Arkansas Model Instructions and overruled long-standing
precedent.9" Justice Glaze stated that the court reached its decision through
87. 311 Ark. 450,844 S.W.2d 954 (1993). The Fisher court held that an interference must
be improper to be actionable. See id. at 458, 844 S.W.2d at 959.
88. 322 Ark. 453, 909 S.W.2d 329 (1995).
89. See Mason, 333 Ark. at 13, 969 S.W.2d at 165.
90. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 165.
91. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 165. For a listing of the factors in THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §767, see supra text accompanying note 68.
92. See Mason, 333 Ark. at 14, 969 S.W.2d at 165-66.
93. See id., 969 S.W.2d at 165-66 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cnt.
c (1979)).
94. See Mason, 333 Ark. at 14-15, 969 S.W.2d at 166.
95. See Mason, 969 S.W.2d at 166 (Glaze, J., dissenting). Justice Arnold joined in the
dissent and both Justice Arnold and Justice Glaze dissented again on the denial of rehearing.
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erroneous reliance on Fisher, which, according to Justice Glaze, misstated the
court's rule in Walt Bennett.' Justice Glaze reasoned that the court also erred
by relying on Hunt, which, citing Fisher and Walt Bennett, listed the four
elements in a tortious interference with contract claim but also said that, in
order to claim interference, the conduct must be improper.97 Justice Glaze
noted, however, that neither Fisher nor Hunt announced any intention by the
court to abandon its general rule established in Walt Bennett that a plaintiff
did not have to show that the defendant's conduct was improper.98 Justice
Glaze finally noted that proving that defendant's conduct was improper is not
one of the elements that the plaintiff is required to prove under the Arkansas
Model Instructions."
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court to require the plaintiff to
prove improper conduct in a tortious interference with contract claim has
placed Arkansas in line with a majority ofjurisdictions in the United States.l°
By doing so, the court changed long standing Arkansas precedent that the
plaintiff alleging tortious interference with contractual relations or a business
expectancy did not have to prove that the defendant's conduct was in any way
malicious, made with bad faith, or improper in order to prevail on a claim.
The introduction of a new element that the plaintiff is required to prove
creates an inconsistency between the elements specified in the Arkansas
Model Jury Instructions, Civil section 406 and the elements now required by
the Arkansas Supreme Court.
One potential problem with the use of the term "improper" lies with the
vagueness of its definition. The use of the word improper by the court
resulted in a vigorous dissent. Justice Glaze felt that the term was ambiguous
and suggested that the court require the plaintiff to show that the defendant
acted with bad faith.' ° The term was also criticized for vagueness by
Professor Dobbs, who believed the conduct should be independently
actionable to be tortious.'l 2
96. See id. (Glaze, J., dissenting).
97. See id. (Glaze, J., dissenting).
98. See id. (Glaze, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 166-67 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
100. See White, supra note 3, at 102.
101. See Mason, 969 S.W.2d at 167 (Glaze J., dissenting). The term bad faith is defined
in ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, 3d § 407 as "dishonest, malicious, or
oppressive conduct carried out with a state of mind characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit
of revenge." See AMI Civ.3d § 407.
102. See Dobbs, supra note 30, at 335.
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In an introductory note on the subject oftortious interference with an
existing contract or prospective contractual relations, the drafters of the
Restatement explained that they adopted the word improper because it was
neutral on its face." 3 Also, section 870 of the Restatement, which serves as
a guide to determine when to impose liability for harm that was intentionally
inflicted, requires that a defendant's conduct be culpable and notjustifiable.'°
A list of factors, similar to the ones included in section 767 (describing factors
to consider to decide if conduct is improper) are included to determine when
the defendant's conduct meets this standard.' The Restatement, section 766
(defining intentional interference with performance of contract by a third
person) is patterned after section 870 and uses the term improper to represent
the balancing test between culpable and non-justifiable conduct.'
0 6
The use of the terms "culpable" and "non-justifiable" allowed flexibility
in determining who bears the burden of proof. If the plaintiff claimed the
conduct was culpable, she bore the burden of proof. On the other hand, if the
defendant claimed the conduct was justifiable, the defendant bore the burden.
Like section 870, the Restatement section 766 does not identify who bears the
burden of proof, recognizing that the burden may shift with the facts
presented. By placing the burden of proof directly on the shoulders of the
plaintiff, the Arkansas Supreme Court has not allowed the flexibility deemed
attractive by the drafters of the Restatement. Instead, the court has sought to
clarify what the law regarding tortious interference with a contract in
Arkansas is by settling what the requirements of the tort are and who bears the
burden of proof.
Allocating the burden of proof to the plaintiff may result in a restriction
of tort liability. Professor Dobbs vigorously argued for restricting liability for
the tort as necessary for social policy reasons such as encouraging competi-
tiveness in the marketplace, allowing free speech, and maintaining integrity
of the legal system. 1 7 Creating prima facie liability for a defendant whenever
the defendant's conduct is deemed intentional discourages competitiveness in
the marketplace because it creates a duty upon strangers to a contract. 08
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Ch. 37, Introductory Note (1985). In the
Introductory Note, the drafters state that their objective was to adopt a word that was neutral on
its face. The neutrality of the word improper serves two functions. First, it allows the word to
have a special meaning not identifiable by any other tort. Second, it does not suggest on its face
whether a matter at issue is part of a plaintiff's or a defendant's case. This eliminated such
words as unreasonable, unfair, undue, unjust, inequitable and unjustified.
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1984).
105. See id.
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 Introductory Note (1984).
107. See Dobbs, supra note 30, at 335.
108. See Dobbs, supra note 30, at 335.
[Vol. 21
1999] TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 577
Through its decision in Mason, the Arkansas Supreme Court appears to be
encouraging uninhibited competitiveness so long as the competition is neither
illegal nor improper.
Odette Woods

